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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes optimal tines in a model in which
individuals can commit up to two offenses. The fine for the
second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first
offense. There are four natural cases in the model, defined by
assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the
offense. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish
repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In
another case, it may be optimal to impose less severe penalties
on repeat offenders. And in the Iwo remaining cases, the optimal
penalty does not change.
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NBERI. Introduction
It is a common practice to punish repeat offenders more severely for the
same offense than first-time offenders. One influential study of sentencing,
by von Hirsch (1976, p. 84), describes this policy as follows:
"in the American criminal justice system, and in most others
with which we are familiar, an offender's record of previous
convictions considerably influences the severity with which he is
punished. The first offender can expect more lenient treatment than
the repeater."
In a similar vein, guidelines promulgated by the United States Sentencing
Commission (1989, p. 4.1) state that "A defendant's record of past criminal
conduct is directly relevant to fthe purposes of sentencing]." These
guidelines also provide for higher sentences for repeat offenders.
In light of this practice, it is perhaps surprising that there is
relatively little discussion in the literature on deterrence concerning the
optimal policy for punishing repeat offenders4l] This paper adds to that
discussion by developing a simple model in which individuals can commit up to
two offenses and are subject to a fine when they are caught. The fine for the
second offense is allowed to differ from the fine for the first offense.
Individuals take into account that the decision to commit the first offense
may affect the size of the fine imposed on them if they later commit a second
offense.
It will be seen that there are four natural cases within the model,
defined by assumptions about the gains to individuals from committing the
harmful act. In the case fully analyzed it may be optimal to punish repeat
offenders more severely than first-time offenders. In another case,
-I-illustrated by a numerical example, it may be optimal to impose less severe
penalties on repeat offenders. And in the two remaining cases, the optimal
policy is to keep the penalty the same. The rest of the introduction focuses
on the intuition behind the first case.
At first glance, it might appear that the analysis of optimal penalties
for repeated offenses would not differ from the analysis for a single offense.
If the penalty is set optimally with respect to the first offense, and the
harm caused by the second offense is the same, there is no apparent reason to
change the penalty for the second offense. This argument suggests that, if
multiple offenses are possible, a uniform sanction would be optimal (with the
levol of the sanction determined by the conventional one-offense analysis).
The potential superiority of a policy of increasing penalties for repeat
offenders can be explained in the following way. Imagine some characteristic
of an individual -- otherthan the socially-acceptable gain he would get from
engaging in the harm-creating activity -- thataffects his propensity to
engage in the activity.[2J Call this the individual's "offense
propensity." For example, an individual's offense propensity might be
associated with his obtaining an illicit gain from committing the offense (say
he receives pleasure from causing harm to others). The higher is his illicit
gain, the more likely he is to engage in the harm-creating activity and the
higher is his offense propensity.
To optimaLly deter individuals --thatis, to deter them if and only if
their socially-acceptable gain is less than the harm caused -- itis necessary
to make the punishment an increasing function of the individual's offense
propensity. Otherwise, individuals with relatively high offense propensities
(for example, high illicit gains) might be underdeterred --theymight engage
-2-in the activity even when their socially-acceptable gains ate less than the
han. And individuals with relatively low offense propensities (low illicit
gains) might be overdeterred -theymight not engage in the activity even
when their socially-acceptable gains exceed the harm.
But suppose that the enforcement authority cannot observe individuals'
offense propensities. This is a reasonable assumption, for example, if
variations in offense propensities are due to variations in illicit gains.
Obviously, the enforcement authority then cannot make the penalty depend on art
individual's offense propensity.
Imoosinhifher nenalties gfl repeat offenders fln indirect 21
imoosing hifher penalties 211 individuals EStli hitheroffense ørooensities. To
seewhy, observe that individuals with relatively high offense propensities
will be more likely to engage in the harmful activity the first time,
everything else equal. Thus, it can be inferred that individuals who are
caught having engaged in the harmful activity a second sJaare,on average,
those with relatively high offense propensities. For reasons discussed above,
to properly deter such individuals, a higher penalty is required.f31
This result can be reconciled with the intuitive argument discussed
initially that led to the conclusion that a uniform penalty policy is best.
The essence of that argument was that if the penalty is set optimally with
respect to the first offense, and the harm caused by the second offense is the
same,there is no reason to changethe penalty for the second offense. It is
now clear that the imolicit assuirotion in that argumentisthat the
consideration of offense propensity is irrelevant (for example, illicit gains
are zero for everyone). Then a uniform penalty policy based on hanalone is
optimal.Rut if offense propensities are relevant, increasing penalties night
-3-be better.
Section II analyzes the model in the case in which an increasing fine
policy may be optimal. Section III briefly discusses the three remaining
cases and provides a numerical example in which optimal fines decrease.
Section lvcontainssome concluding comments.
II. Ontimal Fines in a Two-Offense Model
To make the distinction between the first and the second offense
meaningful, it is assumed that the offenses are committed sequentially.
Reference will be made to a first period" -- duringwhich at most one offense
can be committed -- andto a "second period" -- alsoduring which at most one
offense can be committed. Because time per Se is not essential to the
analysis, it is assumed that the discount rate is zero.
All individuals are risk neutral. An individual's gain from engaging in
the harmful activity is the sum of two components: a socially-acceptable gain,
which is included in social welfare; and an illicit gain, which is not
included. [4] It is assumed for simplicity that there are two possible
levels of the acceptable gain and two possible levels of the illicit gain.
In the case analyzed in this section, an individual's acceptable gain in
each period is stochastic -- butrevealed to him at the beginning of the
period --whilehis illicit gain is fixed (and invariant from period to
period). For example, a driver may obtain a socially-acceptable gain from
driving fast that depends on circumstances -- whetherrushing to a hospital or
a golf game -.whereashe may obtain an "illicit thrill" from recklessly
endangering others that does not depend on the circumstances. Section III
discusses three other cases in which different assumptions are made about
.4.whether the acceptable and the illicit gains are stochastic or fixed.
In general, the enforcement authority chooses both the probability of
detection and the fine for first and second offenders. Because the principal
concerts of this article is with the structure of fines1 it is assumed that the
probability of detection is fixed and, without loss of generality, equal to
one. (5J
Social,welfare is defined to be the sumoverboth periods of the
aggregate level of acceptable gains less the aggregate harm. (Because the
probability of detection is fixed, enforcement costs will be ignored.)
Obviously, the first-best oitcome is that only individuals with acceptable
gains greater than the harm engage in the activity. If this outcome is
achieved, potential injurers will be said to be optimally deterred.
The following notation will beused:
h—harmifan individual engages in the activity
a1, a2 —levelsof acceptable gain, with 0 ￿ a1 < h < a2
b1, b2 —levelsof illicit gain, with 0 ￿ b1 <
a —probabilityin each period that an individual's acceptable
gain is a1 (0 < a < I)
fi— fractionof individuals with illicit gain b1 (0 < ft< I)
f —fineimposed on an individual whoengagesin the activity
Clearly,a11-b1 <a1+b2 and a2+b1 <a2+b2.Whether a1+b2 is less than or
greater than a2+b1 requires a further assumption.(61 If
a1+b2 < a2+b1, (1)
then the enforcement authority could achieve the first-best outcome by
choosing a uniform fine between a1+b2 and a2+b1; such a fine would deter
individuals with a low acceptable gain even if their illicit gain is high, but
-5-would not deter individuals with a high acceptable gain even if their illicit
gain is low. Therefore, to make the study of optimal fines interesting, it is
assumed that
<at+b2. (2)
Given (2), there are three relevant ranges of the fine, referred to as
low," "moderate," and "high" finesand denoted f, f,, and 4,respectively.
Thethreeranges are defined as follows:(7J
a11-b1 <f< a2-I-b1 <4, < a1+b2< 4<a2+b2. (3)
It can be shown that 1, is inferior to both of the other fines. Relative to
f,, itoverdeterssoiee individuals with high acceptable gains; and relative to
4'itunderdeterssome individuals with low acceptable gains.
Thus, there are four possible fine policies that could be chosen by the
enforcement authority, depending on whether a low fine or a high fine is
imposed for the first offense, and on whether a low fine or a high fine is





Before considering thebehaviorof individuals in response to the
enforcement authority's policy choice, it will be useful to define "types" of
individuals in terms of the revealed value of their acceptablegain in the
firstperiod and their illicit gain. An individual with an acceptable gain of
a1 in the first period and an illicit gain of b1 will be referred to as an
"(a1,b1) type";othertypes will be defined similarly. The gain and






Total population will be normalized to equal one.
There are potentially sixteen cases to analyze -- thebehavior of each of
the four types of individuals defined by (5) under each of the four possible
fine policies defined by (4). Because it would be tedious to examine all of
these cases explicitly, only one case will be analyzed here.
Consider the behavior of an (a11b2) type under the low-high (('h) fine
policy. By definition, an individual of this type has a high illicit gain b2
in both periods and a low acceptable gain a1 in the first period. In the
second period, with probability a he again will have a low acceptable gain,
but with probability (1-a) he will have a high acceptable gain. The
individual must decide whether to engage in the harmful activity in the first
period and in the second period.
Suppose the individual, engages in the harmful activity in the first
period. He then will face a high fine Aifhe engages in the activity in the
second period. If his acceptable gain in the second period is a1, he will not
engage in the second period because a1+b2 <f,(see (3)). However, if his
acceptable gain in the second period is a2, he will engage in the second
period because a2+b2 > f. Therefore, if he engages in the first period, his
expected gain net of his expected fine payment is
-7.+ (l-a)((a2+b2).fAj. (6)
The first term (in brackets) is his net gain in the first period and the
second teni is his expected net gain in the second period.
Suppose, alternatively, that the individual does not engage in the
harmful activity in the first period. He then will face a low fine f1 if he
engages in the activity in the second period. Regardless of his acceptable
gain in the second period, he will engage in the second period because a2-i-b2 >
> f.Therefore, if he does not engage in the first period, his
expected gain net of his expected fine payment is
a((a1+b2)-f1) +(l-a)((a2+b2)-f,J. (7)
It is straightforward to show from the second-to-last inequality in (3)
that (7) exceeds (6). In other words, an (a1,b2) type subject to the (f,,%)
fine policy will not engage in the harmful activity in the first period but
will engage in the second period. Consequently, social welfare associated
with an individual of this type under this fine policy is
e(a1-h) +(1-a)(a2-h). (B)
The behavior of each type of individual under each possible fine policy
can be derived in a similar fashion. The social welfare consequences are
summarized in Table 1. Thus, for example, in the row corresponding to the
(a1,b2) type of individual and the column corresponding to the (,'h)fine
policy, the entry is the one derived in (8) above. All of the other entries
are self-explanatory except in two cases. Under the (h.:)finepolicy, the
behaviorof both the (a1,b2) and (a1,b1) types depends on the parameters of the
model (see the appendix for details). In these cases, there are two possible
outcomesand therefore two possible levels of social welfare; both levels are
shown in Table I.
-8-TABLE I
THESOCIALWELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTERNATIVE FINE POLICIES,
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Under the (k',)finepolicy, the behavior of the
(a1,b2)types andthe (a21b1) types depends on the
paraiseter values. In each case there are two possible
behavioral outcomes and resulting levels qf welfare.
Both levels are provided in the table. See the appendix
for details.
-9-Anregate social welfare under each fine policy can be calculated from
the information in Table 1 by multiplying the fraction of each type of
individual by the level of social welfare associated with that typo. For




Nextconsider whether a policy of increasing fines, decreasing fines, or
uniform fines is optimal. It can be shown thata decreasingfine policy
never is preferred in the case studied in this section. The proof of
this result, which is complicated by the fact that individual behavior is
indeterminate for the (a1,b2) and (a2,b1) types under the decreasing fine
policy, is provided in the appendix.
Under the low uniform fine policy (f,,f,) aggregate social welfare is
2o(l-fl)(a1-h) +2(l-a)(a2-h), (10)
andunder the high uniform fine policy (1a.1h) it is
2(l-a)(l-fl)(a2-h). (11)
A comparison of the levels of aggregate social welfare under the three
relevant policies --see(9), (10), and (11) --leadsdirectly to the
conclusion that: increasing fj Dolicy ff144 i superior SQ k2.tls
uniform fj policies, 11tJ4 and flan2111Xit
a1 (l-fl)a(2-a)+aØ(1-a)2 a1(1-fi)a2+a2fi(l-a2) - C h< . (12)
(1- $)0(2 -a)+$(1-a) 2
(I-fl)2+p (1 a2)
Thefirst inequality follows from the circumstances underwhich (9)isgreater
than(10), and the second inequality follows from the circumstances under
which (9) is greater than (11). If h is less than the left-hand ratio in
-10-(12), the low uniform fine policy (f,,f,) is superior to the others, while if
h is greater than the right-hand ratio in (12), the high uniform fine policy
is preferred. 181
To understand intuitively why each of the fine policies might dominate,
consider how each policy does relative to the first-best outcome. In the
first-best outcome, individuals with low acceptable gains are deterred from
engaging in the harmful activity in both periods, and individuals with high
acceptable gains are induced to engage in the harmful activity in both
periods. The individuals' illicit gains are irrelevant.
First consider how the low uniform fine policy (f,,f,) does relative to
the first-best outcome. Because the fine does not vary with the number of
offenses, an individual's decision whether to engage in the harmful activity
does not depend on the probability distribution of his acceptable gain in
subsequent periods. Thus, it is straightforward to see from (3) that, with a
fine corresponding to f,, this policy never causes overdeterrence but does
lead to underdeterrence when an individual's acceptable gain is a1 and his
illicit gain is 4. This underdeterrence occurs among all (a1,b2) types in
the first period, certain (a1,b2) types in the second period (those whose
second-period acceptable gains remain at a1), and certain (a2,4) types in the
second period (those whose second-period acceptable gains become a1).
Similarly, it can be seen from (3) that the high uniform fine policy
never causes underdeterrence but does lead to overdeterrence when an
individual's acceptable gain is a2 and his illicit gain is b1. This
overdeterrence occurs among all (a2,b1) types in the first period, certain
(a2,b1) types in the secend period (those whose second-period acceptable gains
remain at a2). and certain (aj,b1) types in the second period (those whose
-11-second-period acceptable gains become a2).
The increasing fine policy (,'A)eliminatessome of the underdeterrence
that occurs under the low uniform fine policy as well as some of the
overdeterrence that occurs under the high uniform fine policy. However, the
increasing fine policy still leaves some underdeterrence --among(a1,h2)
types whose second-period acceptable gains remain at a1 -- andsome
overdeterrence -- among(a2,b1) types whose second-period acceptable gains
remain at a2.
This discussion shows why each of the three fine policies can be the
preferred one. If the principal concern is with eliminating overdeterrence,
the low uniform fine policy is the most desirable policy; and if the main
concern is with eliminating underdeterrence, the high uniform fine policy is
the most desirable one. In some circumstances, however, partially reducing
both overdeterrence and underdeterrence by using the increasing fine policy
provides a better compromise.
The argument for increasing fines discussed in the introduction can be
illustrated in the two-offense model. The essence of that argument was that
individuals with high offense propensities were, everything else equal, more
likely to engage in the harmful activity. Under the low uniform fine policy,
the fraction of offenders in the first period with high illicit gains is
(l-fl)/(l-op), which exceeds the fraction of individuals in the general
population with high illicit gains, (1-fl). And under the high uniform fine
policy, all offenders in the first period have high illicit gains. Thus, if a
uniform fine policy is used, individuals who commit offenses in the first
period are more likely than average to have high illicit gains.
Under the increasing fine policy, however, the fraction of offenders in
-12-the first period with high illicit gains is (1-fl), which is smaller than the
fraction under either uniform policy. Thus, the increasing fine policy can be
viewed as a response to the disproportionate number of high illicit gainers
who otherwise would engage in the activity under a uniform fine policy.
The potential advantage of an increasing fine policy can be illustrated
by the following numerical example. Suppose the population is divided equally
between individuals with low and high acceptable gains, and low and high
illicit gains: a —fi — 1/2.Also1 suppose that the levels of the acceptable
and the illicit gains are a1 —$5,000.a2 —$10,000,b1 —$15,000.and b2 —
$25,000.Then the three fine ranges, corresponding to (3), are:
$20,000 < f1 C $25,000 < f',, C $30,000 < f < $35,000. (13)
The condition for the increasing fine policy to be superior to the others,
corresponding to (12), becomes:
$6,250 C h C $8,750. (14)
Suppose, for example, that h —$7,500.Then, using (9), (10), and (11). it is
straightforward to compute that aggregate social welfare under the increasing
fine policy is $1,875, whereas aggregate social welfare under each of the
uniform fine policies is $1,250. Thus, in this example, the optimal policy
would be to impose a fine of $20,000 to $25,000 for the first offense and a
fine of $30,000 to $35,000 for the second offense.
Iii. The Choice of Assumntions within the Model
A key assumption in the model in section II was that individuals'
socially-acceptable gains are stochastic, while their illicit gains are fixed.
There are three natural alternatives to this assumption: that both types of
gain are stochastic; that both are fixed; or that acceptable gains are fixed
-13-and illicit gains are stochastic. This section briefly considers the optimal
fine policy in these cases.
If both types of gain are stochastic, then second offenders would not
differ systematically from first offenders, and there would be no reason to
punish them differently. If both types of gain are fixed, then although
second offenders would differ from first offenders -- theywould on average
have higher illicit gains and higher acceptable gains -- thedifferences do
not imply that higher fines for repeat offenders are desirable. Essentially,
this is because the marginal costs and benefits of raising the fine for second
offenders above that for first offenders have not changed.
Suppose, however, that acceptable gains are fixed and illicit gains are
stochastic. For example, a driver may attach an approximately constant value
to the time saved from driving fast --theacceptable gain --whereashis
illicit thrill may depend on who is with him in the car to be impressed, his
mood, etc.t9] Then for reasons that are essentially the reverse of those
discussed in the previous section, it can be demonstrated that a decreasing
fine policy may be optimal (and that an increasing fine policy never is
desirable).
To see why decreasing fines might be beneficial, consider starting with a
high uniform fine poLicy. Then, in both periods, only individuals with high
acceptable gains and high illicit gains will engage in the harmful activity;
individuals with high acceptable gains and low illicit gains will be
overdeterred. Now suppose instead that a high fine is imposed on first
offenders and a low fine on second offenders, and assume that in the first
period only individuals with high acceptable gains and high illicit gains
engage in the harmful activity.lo) This decreasing fine policy has, by
-14-assumption, the same effect as the high uniform fine policy in the first
period. But it improves welfare in the second period: since allpotential
second offenders are individuals with high acceptable gains1 bylowering the
fine for second offenders some individuals who would have beenoverdeterred
because their illicit gain in the second period is low can beencouraged to
engage in the activity.
The numerical example at the end of section II can be used to illustrate
the potential superiority of a decreasing fine policy. Let theparameter
values be the same as before (with Ii —$7,500),but now assume that the
acceptable gains are fixed and the illicit gains are stochastic. Under a
decreasing fine policy, the behavior of certain types of individuals depends
on the particular levels of the high fine f,, and the low fine f1. (This
complication was ignored in the example in section II because, under the
assumption there, the decreasing fine policy was dominated by one of the other
policies.) Thus, for concreteness, suppose f —$34,000and f1 —$24,000.It
can then be calculated that social welfare under a decreasing fine policy is
$1,562. whereas social welfare under each of the uniform fine policies is
$1,250. and social welfare under an increasing fine policy is $625.
IV. Concluding Remarks
This section contains comments about the exclusion of socially-acceptable
gains as a basis for offense propensities; generalizations of the model;
alternative bases for offense propensities; and another deterrence rationale
for punishing repeat offenders differently.
(a) Ihexclusion socially-accemtable nins basis f2 offense
oroDonsities: In section I it was noted that an individual's socially-
-15 -acceptable gain could not serve as the basis for his offense propensity (as
that term is used in this article). At first glance this may seem peculiar
because socially-acceptable gains vary among individuals, affect their
decisions whether to engage in harm-creating activities, and may be difficult
for an enforcement authority to observe. However, if individuals differ only
in terms of their socially-acceptable gains, optimal deterrence can be
achieved by a penalty that is based solely on the harm caused and, therefore,
thatdoes not change with the number of offenses. For if individuals are made
to take into account the han caused, they will engage in the harmful activity
if and only if their socially-acceptable gains exceeds the harm. This claim
is not valid ifindividuals differ in other ways that affect their propensity
toengage in the harmful activity.
(b)Generalizations g model:There are two natural ways to
generalize the model. First, both the socially-acceptable gains and the
illicit gains could be made continuous rather than discrete. When this
generalization was attempted, the model became analytically intractable.
However, we believe that if the model were generalizable along these lines,
results similar to those discussed in sections Ii and III would occur. A
second generalization of the model would be to allow the number of possible
offenses to be greater than two. Our conjecture is that in a model with more
than two offenses the optimal fine would strictly increase with the number of
offenses in the case studied in section II (provided an increasing fine policy
is preferred), and strictly decrease in the reciprocal case.
(c) Alternative bases foffenseDropensities: In this article,
variations in offense propensities were attributed to variations in illicit
gains. There are at least two other plausible sources of variations in
-16-offense propensities. One is the pure disutility of time spent in jail. The
lower this disutility, the higher the offense propensity. Another source of
variation might be due to risk aversion. The less risk averse an individual,
the more likely he is to engage in a harm-creating activity, and therefore the
higher is his offense propensity. in each case additional complexity arises
because of the need to include another factor in the determination of social
welfare --eitherthe disutility of time in jail or risk-bearing costs. It is
not clear without further analysis whether the insights derived from the
illicit-gain model would apply when variations in offense propensities are due
to these sources(llj
(d) Another deterrence rationale f2rounishincreyept offenders
differently: It was assumed throughout the article that the probability of
detecting a repeat offender is the same as for a first-time offender. More
generally, however, this probability might be expected to change. For
example, because repeat offenders are more experienced in committing offenses,
they may be less likely to be detected. Then, to achieve optimal deterrence,
it would be necessary to make the level of punishment rise with the number of
offenses to make up for the declining probability of punishment. Conversely,
repeat offenders may be more likely to be detected and punished -- perhaps
because the enforcement authority already has some information about
thea(12J --inwhich case the optimal penalty would fall with the number
of offenses.
-17-ADoendix
The appendix demonstrates that the decreasing fine policy (4.f,) is
strictly inferior to the other policies when the socially-acceptable gains are
stochastic and the illicit gains are fixed. This will be done by showing that
either the low uniform fine policy (f,,f,) or the high uniform fine policy
leads to a higher level of aggregate social welfare.
Under the decreasing fine policy there are two possible outcomes for both
the(a1.b2) and the (a21b1) types. An (a1,b2) type of individual either will
engagein the harmful activity in both periods (if (l+a)(a1+b2)< fg+afj,).in
which case the top entry in the corresponding box in Table•l applies; or he
will not engage in the first period, but will engage in the second period if
his acceptable gain is high, in which case the bottom entry applies.
Similarly, an (a2,b1) type of individual either will not engage in the first
period and will engage in the second period if his acceptable gain is high (if
(2-a)(a2+b1) > (l.a)f1+f), in which case the top entry applies; or he will not
engage in either period, in which case the bottom entry applies. (13j
It will be useful first to show that under the decreasing fine policy
only two of the four combinations ofthese outcomes are possible: the top
entryfor the (a1,b2) types combined with the bottom entry for the (a21b1)
types; or the bottom entry for the (a1,b2) types combined with the top entry
for the (a2,b1) types.
The argument involves a proof by contradiction. Assume initially that
the top entry applies for both the (a1.b2) and the (a2,b1) types, that is,
(l+a)(a1+b2) < (Al)
and
(2-a)(a2+b1) > (l-a)fj + 4. (A2)
18 -It will be shown that (Al) and (A2) cannot hold simultaneously. Recall from
(5) that:
C f < a2tb1 C a1+b2 C 4Ca2it2. (A3)
Let
f1—a1+b1+91(a2-a1), (A4)
where 0 << and
4— a1+b2+62(a2-a1), (AS)





Note that (A3) implies that (b2-b1) >(a2-a1).Therefore, for (A6) and (A?) to




Multiplying both sides of (AS) by (I-a) and comparing the resulting inequality
to (A9) shows the contradiction. A similar argument also can be used to
demonstrata that the two bottom entries cannot hold simultaneously.
To distinguish between the two mutually exclusive combinations that can
occur under the decreasing fine policy, let Case I refer to the situation in
which the top entry for the (a11b2) types and the bottom entry for the (a2,b1)
types applies. Similarly, let Case II refer to the situation in which the
bottom entry for the (a11b2) types and the top entry for the (aj,b2) types
applies.
-19-In Case I aggregate social welfare under the decreasing fine policy is
(see Table 1):
2a(l-ft)(a1-h) +(l-o)(2-oft)(a2-h). (AlO)
A comparison of (AlO) to (10) shows that aggregate social welfare under the
low uniform fine policy is greater (since 2-aft <2).
Similarly, in Case II aggregate social welfare is:
a(l-a)(1-ft)(a1-h) +2(l-a)(l-ft)(a2-h). (All)
A comparison of (All) to (11) shows that aggregate social welfare under the
high uniform fine policy is greater (since a1-h <0).
Thus, the decreasing fine policy always is inferior to one of the uniform
fine policies.
20 -Notes
[*]Polinsky's research was supported by the John M. Olin Program in Law
and Economics at Stanford Law School and Rubinfeld's research was supported by
the National Science Foundation Programs in Law and Social Science and
Economics. During the writing of this paper we benefitted from conversations
or correspondence with Michael Block, Rayner Cheung, Michael Davis, Hugh
Cravelle, I.ouis Kaplow, Paul Rubin, Ariel Rubinstein, Steven Shavell, Edward
Sherry, Ceorge Stigler, and two referees.
fi]Inthe modern economic literature on deterrence, Stigler (1970,
pp. 528-529) was the first person to discuss informally why first offenders
should be punished more leniently than repeat offenders. There also is an
interesting informal discussion by Posner (1985, pp. 1216-1217; 1986, pp. 213-
215). To our knowledge, only Rubinstein (1979. 1960) has formally analyzed
optimal penalties in a dynamic model with repeat offenses. His first paper
shows how prior offenses should be taken into account in deciding whether to
impose anypunishmentat all; he does not consider whether the level of
punishmentshould depend on the number of prior offenses. His second paper
demonstrates that there exists a utility functionfor which a policy of
imposinghigher penalties on repeat offenders increases deterrence.
Landsberger and Meilijson (1982) also develop a dynamic modelwith repeat
offenses,but theirconcern is with how prior offenses should affect the
probabilityof detection rather than the level of punishment. Keenen and
Rubin(1986) analyze a static model that tangentially relates to repeated
offenses, but they acknowledge that "what is apparently needed (to study
repeat offenders] is a dynamic model" (p. 14). The focus of their paper is on
how the optimal penalty varies with the severity of the harm.
-21-12) The reason for excluding his socially-acceptable gain (any gain
that counts toward the determination of social welfare) in the statement in
this sentence is explained in comment (a) in section IV below.
(3] This rationale for imposing higher penalties on repeat offenders
is analogous to the rationale for charging an insured a higher premium after a
claim is made ("experience rating") and for rewarding a worker with higher pay
after a successful outcome ("merit rating"). See, for example, Venezia and
Levy (1983) and Viscusi (1966).
It will become clear in section III below that the explanation provided
here requires that individuals' offense propensities are fixed and that their
socially-acceptable gains are stochastic.
(4) In Becker's (1968) article on crime and punishment, all gains
were treated as socially-acceptable. However, in response to that article,
Stigler (1970, p. 527) wrote: "The determination of this social value [of the
gain to offenders) is not explained, and one is entitled to doubt its
usefulness as an explanatory concept: what evidence is there that society sets
a positive value upon the utility derived from a murder, rape, or arson? In
fact the society has branded the utility derived from such activities as
illicit."
(5)Tothe extent that the investment in enforcement effort applies
to a wide range of harms, it is appropriate to treat the probability of
detection with respect to any one type of harm as fixed. See generally
Shavell (1991). If the probability of detection were less than one, the only
effect on the results would be that the optimal fines would have to be raised
(assuming that the wealth constraint of individuals is not binding) so that
the expected fines equal those discussed in this article.
-22-(6) The special case in which a1+b2 —a2+b1will not be considered.
(71It can be shownthata fineless than a1+b1 or greater than a2+b2
never is optimal.
18] Because the ratios in (12) are arithmetic weighted averages of a
and a2, the left-hand ratio is greater than a1 and the right-hand ratio is
less than a2. In addition, it can be demonstrated that the left-hand ratio is
less than the right-hand ratio.
(9) This example was suggested by Louis Kaplow.
(10) Under a decreasing fine policy, other types of individuals also
may engage in the first period depending on the parameter values and the
levels of the fines. The assumption made in the text simplifies the
discussion.
[11] Another generalization would be to allow for the possibility of
falseconvictions. In the conventional analysis of deterrence in which only
one offense is considered, false convictions reduce deterrence because the
incremental cost of becoming an offender is reduced. In the repeat offense
context, there may be an opposing tendency ifafalse conviction raises the
finethat a potential offender would face in the future, and a reinforcing
tendency if it lowers the fine. Also, Rubinstein (1979) has shown that if
individuals can be found liable by mistake, it is optimal to punish an
individual only if his long-run record is 'unreasonably' bad" (p. 407).
112) See Stigler (1970, p. 530). Also, Posner (1985, p. 1216, n.
43) has pointed out that a previousoffender is easier to convict than a
firstoffender, because if he takes the stand the prosecution can introduce
his record of convictions to try to undermine his credibility.
-23-[13) If (1+a)(a1+b2) — the(a11b2) types are indifferent
between thetwoalternatives described. Siailarly, if (2-a)(a2+b1) —
(l-a)f,+f*,the(a2,b1) types are indifferent between their alternatives. It
is assumed in the proof, arbitrarily, that the second alternative is chosen in
each case. The conclusion in the appendix also holds if the first alternative
is chosen.
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